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The international community, led by the United Nations, 
created Kosovo’s new post-war institutions and continues 
to influence them, even after Kosovo declared independ-
ence in 2008. Yet despite enormous international involve-
ment and the clear intention of the international commu-
nity to develop institutions that will promote economic 
development, Kosovo’s governance institutions remain 
weak, especially in the field of public administration and 
the rule of law. The present paper applies the garbage can 
model of governance to explain the creation of institutions 
in Kosovo and identify the design flaws that have led to 
weak institutions. For its case studies, it focuses on the pri-
vatisation of socially owned property and the development 
of contract law. A complex international environment with 
different policy preferences and the drive of internation-
* Robert Muharremi, PhD, Assistant Professor, Rochester Institute of Technology 









al actors to promote their national solutions to Kosovo’s 
problems in a decontextualised manner have contributed 
to the creation of weak institutions that continue to influ-
ence Kosovo’s development to date.
Keywords: organised anarchy, garbage can model, Kosovo, 
institution-building, rule of law, international administration
1. Introduction
The key question addressed in this paper is why Kosovo’s institutional sys-
tem, and the rule of law in particular, is so weak despite much internation-
al expertise, assistance and funding having been provided to Kosovo for 
almost two decades to support institution-building. Applying the garbage 
can model approach to decision-making provides an explanation of how 
institutions are developed and why, despite perhaps the best intentions of 
those who designed them, they do not produce the desired results and fail 
to solve underlying policy problems. 
After almost two decades of internationally led institution-building, Kosovo 
is still, measured by European standards, a poor country. With a population 
of around 1.8 million, Kosovo has a GDP of 7.1 billion US$, which is one of 
the lowest in Europe, coupled with a high poverty and unemployment rate. 
Its economy is characterised by unsustainable finances, a persistent trade 
deficit, a weak production base, informal economy, reliance on remittances 
and a high unemployment rate. Public administration and the rule of law 
are still weak and allegations of corruption, clientelism and nepotism in 
government institutions are commonplace. This is despite the enormous 
amount of international assistance which has been provided to Kosovo by 
the international community since 1999, when the United Nations assumed 
administrative responsibility for Kosovo. According to Capussela (2015, p. 
12), “after the 1999 conflict Kosovo received from the international com-
munity 50 times more peacekeeping troops and 25 times more funds than 
Afghanistan did after the 2001 war”. The EU alone has provided more than 
4 billion Euro in aid, which is the largest annual per capita contribution ever 
provided to a third country (Capussela, 2015, p. 12). 
The international community, led by the United Nations, also created 
Kosovo’s new post-war institutions and continues to influence them, even 
after Kosovo declared independence in 2008. One of the very first prior-
ities of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
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(UNMIK) was to establish the rule of law and to develop institutions and 
legal frameworks for a normally functioning economy (United Nations, 
1999, pp. 10-11). This reflects the understanding that the rule of law is 
a necessary institution for economic development, while lack of it could 
significantly hinder economic growth (Krever, 2011, p. 305).
There is an overall consensus that institutions, including the rule of law, de-
termine a country’s economic success and development (Acemoglu & Rob-
inson, 2012, p. 73). Institutions may be defined as rules, whether formal 
(constitutions and laws) or informal (customs, traditions, practices), which 
influence behaviour and social interaction (Groenenwegen, Spithoven & 
van den Berg, 2010, pp. 24-25). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 74-
75) claim that for economic development to be successful, the economic 
institutions of a country must be inclusive, i.e. they must be characterised 
by secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and the creation 
of an environment where people can exchange and contract. A country’s 
economic institutions are the result of its political institutions (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012, pp. 74-75). As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 75) 
conclude, “secure property rights, the law, public services, and the freedom 
to contract and exchange all rely on the state”. Whether institutions are 
inclusive or extractive, i.e. designed to extract incomes and wealth from 
one group to another (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 76), depends on 
whether political power is distributed broadly in society and subject to con-
straints, or whether it is in the hands of a narrow elite with few constraints 
on the exercise of power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 80-81). 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s explanation of the relationship between insti-
tutions and economic development implies that institutions are the prod-
uct of rational decision-making. It also assumes that those in power are 
a homogenous unit which shares the same preferences. The same applies 
to the World Bank’s understanding of the rule of law and the role that 
the state plays in economic development. According to the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2017, p. 83), “it has long been established that the rule 
of law - which at its core requires that government officials and citizens 
be bound by and act consistently with the law - is the very basis of the 
good governance needed to realise full social and economic potential”. 
The state sets and enforces rules which underpin private transactions and 
which encourage and complement the activities of private businesses and 
individuals (Krever, 2011, p. 305). In doing so, it provides a stable envi-
ronment for efficient market operations (Krever, 2011, p. 313). This is 
clearly an instrumental concept where preferences are clear and are pur-
sued by rational actors, i.e. the state. Furthermore, even if interest groups 
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within the state are important, they are also rational actors and pursue 
clearly defined preferences. Given the enormous involvement of various 
international organisations and donors in Kosovo for over two decades, 
whose clear goal is to develop the rule of law in Kosovo, why is Kosovo’s 
rule of law system and economic development still so weak? The garbage 
can model approach to decision-making can be applied to provide an ex-
planation as to why the rule of law and economic development have not 
produced the desired results. 
Since the rule of law is a very broad concept, the present analysis focuses 
on two important aspects of the rule of law: property rights and contract 
law. These two aspects are particularly relevant from a new institution-
al economics perspective, which, according to Daniels and Trebilcock 
(2004, p. 101) “emphasises that the protection of private property rights 
and the facilitation and enforcement of long-term contracts are essential 
to raising levels of investment and hence economic growth”. The follow-
ing two case studies, one on property rights and the other on contracts, 
analyses the development of Kosovo’s privatisation policy and its attempt 
to regulate contract law. 
The case studies on privatisation and the civil code are preceded by an 
outline of the original garbage can model of decision-making. The case 
studies and the resulting conclusions are presented with this theoretical 
framework in mind.
2. Garbage Can Model of Decision-Making
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972, p. 1) developed the garbage can model 
of decision-making in so-called organised anarchies. Organised anarchies 
are organisations or decision situations which are characterised by prob-
lematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation. Problem-
atic preferences means that the “organisation operates on the basis of 
a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences,” which are in fact 
a “loose collection of ideas” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 1). Ac-
tors lack clarity about both problems and goals (Lipson, 2007, p. 81) and 
they discover their preferences through action rather than acting based on 
preferences (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 1). As Peters (2002, p. 9) 
explains, “individual actors may have consistent preferences, but the pol-
icy making system qua-system is assumed to encounter substantial diffi-
culty in reconciling those varied preferences and making them coherent”. 
Unclear technology refers to the rules, structures and processes of the 
11























organisation according to which decisions are made (Lipson, 2007, p. 82). 
Actors do not understand the organisation’s own processes, they proceed 
on a simple trial-and-error basis, using lessons from past experiences and 
pragmatic inventions of necessity (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 1). 
Fluid participation emphasises that actors have limited time and atten-
tion to devote to the organisation’s processes and their involvement varies 
from time to time (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 1), is capricious and 
therefore not predictable (Peters, 2002, p. 11). Participants change dur-
ing the decision-making process and with them change the preferences 
and knowledge of the organisation’s processes (Lipson, 2007, p. 82).
In such an organised anarchy, “a decision is an outcome or interpreta-
tion” of four independent streams: problems, solutions, participants, and 
choice opportunities (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, pp. 2-3). Problems 
are defined as concerns which require attention (Cohen, March & Olsen, 
1972, p. 3). However, in an organised anarchy the meaning and inter-
pretation of a problem is poorly defined by the different actors (Lipson, 
2007, p. 82) and each actor defines the problem from their own viewpoint 
and interests. Solutions are viewed as products that are looking for a prob-
lem (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 3). Solutions precede problems 
because they are already there, and are only later connected to a problem 
(Aberbach & Christensen, 2001, p. 411). A solution-driven, rather than 
a problem-driven process is the key feature of a garbage can model of 
decision-making in organised anarchies (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001, 
p. 411). Solutions are very often ready-made; initiated by other organi-
sations or countries and decontextualised, i.e. intended to be applicable 
everywhere irrespective of the local context (Aberbach & Christensen, 
2001, p. 411). As Aberbach and Christensen (2001, p. 411) observe, such 
ready-made solutions can be “irrational in that they do not specifically 
address current problems in public organisations or are loosely coupled 
to a national structural or cultural context”, and as such they are likely to 
“produce unexpected and unwanted effects”. Different actors interpret 
problems and solutions differently and try to attach their solution to a 
problem as they interpret it (March & Olson, 1983, p. 287). The partic-
ipants are the actors involved in the decision-making process and they 
come and go depending on the time and the attention they commit to 
the process (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 3). On the one hand, there 
is usually an attention deficit, especially of major political actors who are 
critical for a decision (March & Olson, 1983, p. 286). On the other hand, 
less important actors and otherwise-unoccupied actors may move to the 
front turning the process into a collection of “solutions looking for prob-
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lems, ideologies looking for soapboxes, pet projects looking for support-
ers, and people looking for jobs, reputations, or entertainment” (March 
& Olson, 1983, p. 286). Lastly, choice opportunities are occasions when 
the organisation can make decisions and these are usually determined 
by the organisation’s processes (Lipson, 2007, p. 82). These choice op-
portunities are like a garbage can into which participants dump various 
problems and solutions. Whether a solution attaches to a problem de-
pends more on timing and context, i.e. whether solutions and problems 
arise at the same time and whether they happen to be present at the time 
of the choice opportunity, rather than on a rational choice of solutions 
to problems (Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2014, pp. 451-452). Aberbach and 
Christensen (2001, p. 411) conclude that “if actors seek to act rationally 
in such processes, this is best characterised as local rationality and may 
lead to problems with organisational rationality because local actors have 
narrow perspective and a shortage of influence, attention and knowledge, 
and do not manage to take a broad view of, coordinate or control, the 
larger decision-making context”.
In an organised anarchy, decisions are usually made by flight and over-
sight, which means that problems are not really resolved (Cohen, March 
& Olsen, 1972, p. 9). A decision by flight means that there is no decision 
because, according to Fioretti and Lomi (2009, p. 4), actors “shy away from 
a difficult problem by removing the most difficult problem from the agenda 
of the current choice opportunity to attach it to another choice opportuni-
ty, one that will be due at a later time”. Decisions are either postponed or 
buck-passed to some other actor (Fioretti & Lomi, 2009, p. 10). Decision 
by oversight means that a problem is not solved at all (Fioretti & Lomi, 
2009, p. 4). Overall, in an organised anarchy “problems are less likely to 
be solved, decision makers are likely to shift from one problem to another 
more frequently, choices are likely to take longer to make and are less likely 
to resolve problems” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 9). As a result, “al-
though decision making is thought of as a process for solving problems, that 
is often not what happens” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 16).
The garbage can model provides an alternative to the rational choice model 
of decision-making which assumes a linear process where first objectives are 
determined, then decision alternatives are identified and their consequenc-
es evaluated, and then a decision is made among the alternatives which best 
suits the objectives to be achieved (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 2). 
One of the most prominent variations of the original garbage can model is 
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. Kingdon’s primary concern is to ex-
plain how certain issues get on the political agenda. His view is that an issue 
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manages to get on the agenda when three independent streams; problems, 
policies and politics are coupled in a policy window. The coupling does 
not happen by chance, as in the original garbage can model, but because 
of the efforts of policy entrepreneurs to make use of such policy windows 
“to push their pet solutions or to push attention to their special problems” 
(Kingdon, 1972, p. 203). According to Kingdon, “policy entrepreneurs are 
people willing to invest their resources in return for future policies they fa-
vour. They are driven by their straightforward concern about certain prob-
lems, their pursuit of such self-serving benefits as protecting or expanding 
their bureaucracy’s budget or claiming credit for accomplishment, their 
promotion of their policy values, and their simple pleasure in participation” 
(Kingdon, 1972, p. 204). Policy entrepreneurs play a critical role in the pro-
cess, especially since “problems get attention based on how they are framed 
or defined by participants who compete for attention in the policy game” 
(Saurugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 37). Since Kingdon’s model is focused on 
agenda-setting it is difficult to apply it to other stages of the policy process 
or in general to decision-making in organisations (Howlett, McConnell & 
Perl, 2015, p. 422). However, it makes sense to include policy entrepre-
neurs in the original garbage can model to provide a better explanation of 
how solutions are attached to problems, depending on how they define the 
problem and the solution which they favour.
This is the theoretical background against which the two major reform ef-
forts to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo for facilitating economic de-
velopment, i.e. the privatisation of socially owned property and the effort 
to draft a comprehensive civil code, are illustrated. The main argument 
is that institution-building in Kosovo, even under international admin-
istration, reflects organised anarchy, where certain policy entrepreneurs 
promote specific solutions and define problems in such a way as to fit the 
solution without assessing if the real problem is indeed addressed and if 
the promoted solution indeed solves the problem.
3. Case studies: Privatisation and Civil Code Reforms
3.1. Privatisation Reform
The privatisation of Kosovo’s socially owned enterprises (SOE) is perhaps 
one of the most complex undertakings of the United Nations (UN) in the 
context of a peacekeeping operation. From 1999 to 2008, the UN, acting 
through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
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(UNMIK), designed and implemented the privatisation process. It is the 
only privatisation process which was initiated and implemented by the 
UN under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 1999, SOEs were the main 
commercial organisations in Kosovo covering almost all of its mining, in-
dustry and agricultural business (Knudsen, 2013, p. 292). These enterpris-
es were all socially owned, which is a former Yugoslav-socialist property 
concept, fundamentally different from a Western-liberal understanding of 
property rights (Knudsen, 2013, p. 292).
The legal nature of socially owned property was a matter of controver-
sy even in Yugoslavia. Some viewed socially owned property as a form 
of ownership (Coronna, 1985, p. 230), owned by society in general, but 
there was disagreement as to who was entitled to use it. Opinions ranged 
from the state to every self-management entity, as being the representa-
tive of society, including the opinion that the state, the republic, the local 
community and labour organisations held divided ownership (Coronna, 
1985, pp. 230-232). It was also suggested that socially owned property 
was in fact state property which was given to workers in perpetuity for 
utilisation and management (Peselj, 1963, p. 698). There were others who 
viewed socially owned property as an entitlement under public law rath-
er than a property right (Coronna, 1985, p. 234). The legal complexity 
surrounding socially owned property was further complicated by the fact 
that in 1988 Yugoslavia initiated a program for the privatisation of SOEs 
allowing them to be transformed into joint stock companies (Medjad, 
2004, p. 304). As Serbia suspended Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, followed 
by the exclusion of most Kosovo Albanians from participation in political 
processes, Kosovo considered the privatisation to be illegitimate. 
UNMIK’s mandate under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (adopt-
ed in 1999) added to the complexity. Following an armed conflict with 
Serbia, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and authorised the Secretary-General to establish 
an international civil presence in Kosovo, known as UNMIK. UNMIK’s 
mandate was to provide an interim administration for Kosovo, including 
economic reconstruction. However, Resolution 1244 was not clear as to 
the legal status of Kosovo under the UN’s interim administration. On 
the one hand, Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while on the other hand 
it was ambiguous as to the question of whether Kosovo should become 
an independent state or remain an autonomous entity within Yugoslavia 
(Knoll, 2005, p. 638). Although all legislative and executive authority with 
respect to Kosovo was vested in the Special Representative of the Secre-
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tary-General (SRSG), the ambiguity inherent in Resolution 1244 caused 
major controversies as to UNMIK’s authority to privatise socially owned 
property (Everly, 2007, p. 22). 
Despite its deployment in 1999, UNMIK was not able to assume full 
authority over Kosovo until early 2000. During this time, various warlords 
and persons connected to these structures seized control of SOEs and 
used them for personal enrichment through asset stripping and exorbitant 
leases (UNMIK, 2002, pp. 9-11). UNMIK (2002, p. 6) described SOEs 
as “quasi-feudal estates, where a privileged few wielded control over assets 
belonging to society as a whole and diverted the revenues for their own 
profit”.
Uncertainty as to the meaning of socially owned property, legal ambiguity 
concerning the scope of UNMIK’s mandate, Serbia’s insistence on re-
specting its sovereignty over Kosovo, and de facto control of SOEs by dif-
ferent Kosovo Albanian political factions characterised the political and 
legal environment in which the United Nations embarked on the privati-
sation process. UNMIK’s organisational structure added to the complex-
ity. It was organised in four pillars, which were under the authority of the 
SRSG. The pillars reported to the SRSG, who took most of the decisions 
only after clearance by the UNMIK Legal Office. Political decisions had 
to be coordinated and were subject to approval by the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Legal Office at the UN 
headquarters in New York. Pillar IV, which was administered and staffed 
by the EU, was responsible for economic reconstruction, including pri-
vatisation (Knudsen, 2013, p. 291). Although under EU authority, the 
legal department of Pillar IV was staffed by USAID, which promoted a 
neoliberal approach to economic development, emphasising privatisation 
as a key instrument to economic reform. As Knudsen (2013, p. 290) ob-
served, in addition to different actors involved in the process, UNMIK’s 
set-up was not favourable to long-term policy planning. Its mandate lasted 
one year and was subject to extension on an annual basis, and UNMIK 
personnel worked primarily on short-term contracts and consisted of in-
ternational bureaucrats with little sense of ownership or responsibility for 
UNMIK’s mandate (Knudsen, 2013, p. 290). Most of Pillar IV’s budget 
was spent on salaries for international staff (Knudsen, 2013, p. 299).
The establishment of the Kosovo Trust Agency was initially opposed by 
the UN because of liability concerns (UNMIK, 2002, p. 18). The UN be-
lieved that the permanent change of property rights, which would be the 
result of privatisation, went beyond the interim administration mandate 
established in Resolution 1244 (Zaum, 2007, p. 156). The UN was also 
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concerned about possible liability claims against them that could arise 
from lawsuits by owners or creditors of socially owned enterprises that 
had been privatised in the 1990’s (Zaum, 2007, p. 159). The UN also 
believed that the Kosovo Trust Agency would be a subsidiary organ of the 
Security Council and that the UN would therefore be responsible under 
international law for the Agency’s actions. 
Despite the UN’s concerns, both the US and the EU representations 
within UNMIK pushed for privatisation. The term Kosovo Trust Agency 
is an almost literal adaptation of the German Treuhandanstalt, which was 
responsible for privatising Germany’s social enterprises following Germa-
ny’s unification. The German deputy director of Pillar IV used the Treu-
handanstalt as a model for Kosovo’s privatisation, including the name. As 
a result of negotiations between the UN, EU and US components of 
UNMIK, the UN endorsed privatisation under the condition that (i) the 
Kosovo Trust Agency would be established as an entity separate from 
UNMIK in order to limit UNMIK’s and UN’s exposure to liability, (ii) 
the role of the SRSG in the operations of the Kosovo Trust Agency was to 
be reduced as much as possible in order to distance UNMIK and the UN 
from possible liability claims, (iii) the proceeds of privatisation would be 
held in trust by the Kosovo Trust Agency to satisfy claims made by own-
ers and creditors of SOEs, and (iv) a judicial review mechanism would be 
established to adjudicate property and other privatisation related claims 
made by possible owners and creditors. As Kosovo’s judicial system was 
in a poor state, the UN required that privatisation related decisions be re-
viewed by a court composed of international judges, who would guarantee 
independence and impartiality, and whose procedures would ensure that 
all who claimed ownership interests were able to make submissions and 
appear before the court.
The legislation which established the Kosovo Trust Agency shows that the 
UN’s primary concern was to shield itself and its international officials 
from liability (Knudsen, 2013, p. 293). Knudsen (2013, p. 293) concludes 
that “fear of exposing international officials or institutions to legal liability 
if directly selling the SOEs in Kosovo was to be the single most dominat-
ing concern shaping Pillar IV’s operations”.
The concern with legal liability was manifested most obviously in what 
became known as the status determination problem. In order to privatise 
a SOE, the Kosovo Trust Agency Board had to determine whether an 
entity was a SOE and thus eligible for privatisation. Serbia threatened the 
mostly international Board members that it would sue them if they made 
such decisions, claiming they would violate Serbia’s property rights. The 
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EU, which had seconded the international Board members, asked the 
UN to accord those Board members immunities and privileges, which 
the UN denied. As a result, the international Board members refused 
to make decisions, halting the privatisation process for almost two years. 
Following the March 2004 riots, which were also seen as an expression of 
revolt against economic and political stagnation (Knudsen, 2013, p. 298), 
UNMIK amended the legislation allowing the Kosovo Trust Agency to 
assume that an entity was a SOE without having to make an explicit status 
determination beforehand. This overcame the impasse and privatisation 
resumed, but it also showed that “international officials used legal regula-
tions primarily as a means to ensure implementation of neoliberal reform 
in a manner shielding them from being sued” (Knudsen, 2013, p. 300).
In the years after 2008, when Kosovo declared independence and UN-
MIK ceased to privatise SOEs, privatisation was generally perceived as 
a failure. Around 40 per cent of Kosovars were still living in poverty, al-
most the same number as when the UN started to administer Kosovo 
(Knudsen, 2013, p. 299). Privatisation was widely perceived as a corrupt 
and mismanaged process, which had destroyed Kosovo’s economic basis 
and which had left more than 70.000 former SOE workers unemployed 
(Knudsen, 2013, p. 300).
Nonetheless, Kosovo continued with the privatisation process which was 
designed by international actors to suit primarily their interests and con-
cerns, which is a clear example of institutional path dependency. After in-
dependence, Kosovo did not make any effort to evaluate the privatisation 
process so far, nor review the fundamental decision to privatise SOEs. 
Instead, it followed through with the privatisation process uncritically and 
with very few minor legal modifications. In 2017, the Government offi-
cially acknowledged that most of the privatised SOEs were not function-
al and were not achieving their performance targets, confirming claims 
made by civil society and experts that privatisation has failed to facilitate 
economic reconstruction and development.
3.2.  Civil Code Reform
Kosovo’s attempt to draft a civil code, which would codify in a systematic 
and comprehensive manner all contract, property, family and inheritance 
law, dates back to 2003. The idea of having a civil code is embedded in 
19th century Continental European legal thinking, which assumed that law 
could be collected and ordered comprehensively in a logical and system-
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atic structure. In 2003, an EU funded project assisted the Office of the 
Prime Minister in preparing such a civil code. Despite some first drafts, 
and several rounds of discussions and consultations with stakeholders, 
the Office of the Prime Minister did not follow through and the idea of 
a civil code was abandoned (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 4). Instead, the 
Government decided to regulate civil law through separate pieces of legis-
lation. In 2005, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a law on inheritance, while 
family law was regulated separately in 2006. In 2009, a law on property 
rights was passed and in 2012 a law on obligations, which, with its more 
than 1.000 articles, regulates contracts and torts in a comprehensive man-
ner. All laws were prepared with the support of international donor or-
ganisations, which provided financing and technical assistance. However, 
each of the international donors tried to implant their own legal tradition 
into Kosovo’s legal system, especially in the field of property rights, which 
was already complicated because of the socialist elements which were 
carried over from Kosovo’s Yugoslav past. According to Roccia (2015, p. 
567), the involvement of various international donors in drafting Kosovo’s 
property law created legal confusion and contradictory legislation. Con-
flicts between common law and continental civil law elements, which were 
introduced depending on who the donor was and for which law they were 
providing assistance, were the most prominent (Roccia, 2015, p. 578).
Although the contract and property related legislation was relatively new 
and legal practice based on these laws was still in an early phase of devel-
opment, the Kosovo Ministry of Justice re-launched the idea of drafting 
a civil code in 2013. In its Rule of Law Assistance Strategy, the Ministry 
stated that the rule of law would require a civil code in order to improve 
the performance of the judicial system (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 17). 
The Ministry of Justice (2014, p. 18) argued that since the end of the war 
there had never been adequate policies for property rights, which would 
hinder the resolution of property rights related issues. An underdeveloped 
civil justice system would undermine commercial and property rights, 
which would create obstacles for the social and economic development of 
Kosovo (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 17). A civil code would therefore be 
essential for rule of law and economic development in Kosovo. However, 
the Ministry of Justice never explained why the relatively new contract 
and property legislation was inadequate and why Kosovo really needed 
a civil code. There are other countries in the EU which don’t have a civil 
code, such as Croatia, and still have an effective rule of law system and 
a much firmer economic standing than Kosovo. Inconsistencies in the 
laws could have been addressed by making sure that individual laws were 
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amended and brought in line with each other. This option however was 
never considered as a possible solution. The civil code project became a 
pet project of the Ministry of Justice and was dominated by legal academ-
ics who claimed that Kosovo needed a civil code as a matter of prestige 
and as a symbol of its independent statehood. 
The EU allocated 2 million Euro for a two-year project to support the 
Ministry of Justice in drafting a civil code and a property rights strategy 
(Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 3). It is interesting to note that the EU pro-
ject designated to assist the Ministry in this effort also included a com-
ponent on donor coordination (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 3), as other 
international donors were also involved in this field. These other donors 
were: USAID, which provided assistance in the area of property rights 
and which overlapped in large parts with the EU assistance; the World 
Bank, with a project on property rights cadaster; OSCE, which was ac-
tive in housing rights; the German GIZ, which also provided assistance 
on property rights registration and cadaster; the Swiss Agency for De-
velopment and Cooperation; the Norwegian Cooperation Development 
Agency; and the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, all of whom 
were involved in providing some form of assistance to the government on 
property rights related issues (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 6). All these 
donors had to be included in the process as they had all allocated signifi-
cant resources in an area, which the Ministry of Justice, with EU support, 
now wanted to regulate through a comprehensive civil code. Due to large 
overlaps in project scope, coordination with USAID was very important 
and it very soon crystallised that the EU’s assistance would be limited to 
the civil code, while USAID would take the lead on drafting a property 
rights strategy (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 17).
Although the Ministry of Justice had initiated the drafting of the civil 
code and had requested EU assistance for this purpose, it showed little 
leadership and ownership of the process. Working groups, which were es-
sential due to the complexity of the project and were requested by the EU 
project, were never established (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). Shortly 
after the launch of the project, in 2015, the Government established a 
State Commission to draft the civil code (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). 
The role of the Ministry of Justice was reduced to providing secretarial 
services. The State Commission was led by the Minister of Justice and was 
composed of 25 members, most of them academics (Susino & Moreno, 
2016, p. 11). As the EU noted in a subsequent evaluation of the project, 
the members of the State Commission had extensive knowledge of for-
mer Yugoslav law but limited experience with modern EU contract law 
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(Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 12). Practitioners, such as judges, attorneys 
and notaries, as well as members of civil society, were significantly under-
represented (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 12). The State Commission and 
the EU project worked in parallel, but with little interaction with each 
other and the State Commission did not even invite the EU project to 
attend its sessions (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). As the EU noted in its 
evaluation, the State Commission was “running its own show slowly and 
with very little advancements”. There was no political leadership in the 
Government or the Ministry of Justice to ensure cooperation and coordi-
nation between the Commission and the EU project (Susino & Moreno, 
2016, p. 12). The Minister of Justice gradually assumed a passive role, 
despite his personal interest in a civil code, and the Ministry of Justice 
officials were formally excluded by the State Commission, while the State 
Commission itself was paralysed by internal problems. According to the 
EU, most members of the Commission did not receive any remunera-
tion for their work, which limited their commitment to the work of the 
Commission (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 12). Personal dissatisfaction 
and jealousies also plagued the State Commission as some of the mem-
bers were hired by the EU project as consultants, while others did not 
have that privilege (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). The EU project also 
had its problems. International experts who were brought into the process 
worked separately and, as the EU noted, often did not know each other, 
which prevented interconnection and the exchange of information (Susi-
no & Moreno, 2016, p. 13). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the EU 
project was internally divided as to which European law should be taken 
as a model for Kosovo’s civil code. Very often the national background 
and expertise of the consultant determined which national model would 
serve as a template for certain parts of the civil code. 
In view of the rather passive role of the State Commission, the EU project 
filled the gap by drafting and submitting to the State Commission a first 
draft civil code in 2016. As the EU noted in its evaluation, the State Com-
mission and the Ministry of Justice remained mere spectators, receiving 
the assessments and proposals of the EU project without demonstrating 
effective commitment to the creative process (Susino & Moreno, 2016, 
pp. 21-22). By the end of 2016 the Government dissolved the State Com-
mission and re-mandated the Ministry of Justice to lead the drafting of 
the civil code. After having spent 2 million Euro for two years, the EU 
rolled out a new project worth 2.3 million Euro to again assist the Min-
istry of Justice in drafting a civil code for three more years. The process 
continues to this day and Kosovo still has no civil code.
21
























The case study on privatisation shows that the decision to privatise social-
ly owned enterprises in Kosovo was taken without assessing other options. 
As Knudsen (2013, p. 291) explains, none of the various international ac-
tors indicated that they had “considered other economic approaches than 
pushing for neoliberal reform”. According to Knudsen (2013, p. 291), 
“debates among international officials concentrated on how to privatise, 
not whether to privatise”. The Kosovo side, which by 2001 had a provi-
sional government that acted under the authority of UNMIK, followed 
the economic reform program promoted by the UN, the EU and the US 
without much discussion and substantial input. Their main concern seems 
to have been to secure a stake in the privatisation process by making sure 
that each of the rival Albanian political factions appointed one Deputy 
Director to the Kosovo Trust Agency, which had been established by UN-
MIK to administer the privatisation process.
The complexity surrounding the idea of socially owned enterprises and 
their role in economic development, as well as the complexity related to 
UNMIK’s mandate reflects problematic preferences as one of the con-
stitutive elements of organised anarchies. There were multiple actors, 
both international and local, and each of them had different preferences 
throughout the process. The original idea to privatise SOEs to stimulate 
economic development was superseded during the process by the prefer-
ence to limit the UN’s exposure to potential liability. Rules were evidently 
not designed to have the best possible economic outcome for Kosovo, but 
primarily to shield international officials and organisations from liability. 
In this context, the preferences of the UN, UNMIK, EU and the US, as 
the key actors, were not uniform and not aligned towards the same pref-
erences. While the EU and the US were pushing for fast privatisation, the 
UN was concerned with limiting its legal exposure. The Kosovo side had 
its own preferences, which, unable to control the entire process, satisfied 
itself by trying to establish as much political leverage over the process as 
possible to serve the preferences of certain interest groups. 
The privatisation process also confirms the existence of unclear rules 
and processes of the privatisation program, which were not known to the 
actors, and were only discovered during the process. The complexity of 
the communication process between the UN (DPKO), UNMIK, Pillar 
IV, USAID and the Kosovo government was hardly known to all those 
involved. The other aspect of organised anarchy, i.e. fluid participation, 
is also present. Not only did international policy-makers and officials in 
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UNMIK change frequently over time, but the technical side especially 
saw major fluctuations of experts and consultants who were brought into 
the country to design and implement the privatisation process. The Koso-
vo government’s attention to the process was intense until it secured a say 
in the functioning of the Kosovo Trust Agency, and then it faded away.
The privatisation process clearly shows that the policy process was a solu-
tion-driven process. Privatisation as a solution was already there, with 
the (German) model which was readily available and preferred. It just 
required a few policy entrepreneurs inside UNMIK to create an advocacy 
coalition and push the idea of privatisation forward. There was no thor-
ough analysis if this would indeed be the solution to Kosovo’s economic 
problems and if it would indeed facilitate economic growth.
The privatisation process provides evidence of decision-making by over-
sight. Once the decision was made to privatise Kosovo’s SOEs, nobody 
cared further if that would indeed solve Kosovo’s economic problem, let 
alone if there was even a causal relationship between SOE performance 
and economic growth. The decision did not solve Kosovo’s problem as 
Kosovo’s SOEs were privatised, and Kosovo still remained economically 
weak and without a production base.
The civil code drafting process also confirms the existence of an organised 
anarchy. There were multiple international and local actors who wanted to 
play a role in drafting a civil code for Kosovo, but none of them had a clear 
idea about what this civil code should be and what problem it should really 
address. Each of the actors had their own preferences as to the content 
and structure of the civil code, but there was no overall agreement on these 
issues. The participants had limited attention in the process, especially the 
State Commission. The Minister of Justice was initially very active but then 
lost interest (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). The individual members of 
the State Commission also showed that they had different preferences, not 
necessarily to fully engage in drafting a civil code for Kosovo (Susino & 
Moreno, 2016, p. 11). International experts came in and out to provide lim-
ited input, primarily from each expert’s own viewpoint of what the problem 
and the solution should be (Susino & Moreno, 2016, p. 11). It seems that 
experts came with ready-made solutions from their national legal systems, 
which they tried to insert into Kosovo’s civil code (Roccia, 2015, p. 578). 
Furthermore, the solution, i.e. a civil code, was already available before the 
process had started, but there was no thorough analysis of the underlying 
problem and if a civil would indeed be the right policy choice. 
While a civil code might have worked in other countries, it is not necessar-
ily the case that it would also work in Kosovo. The whole process is a good 
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example of a decontextualised solution-driven process where numerous 
participants interpret the problem and the solution differently and from 
their perspective, and where actor participation is very fluid. The civil 
code process confirms that in such an organised anarchy, problems are 
not solved and decisions are taken by flight or oversight. During the two 
year process, two million Euros were spent and no decision was made on 
either to adopt a civil code or to abandon the idea. Instead, it was decided 
to continue with the process and to take that decision at a later stage; a 
typical decision by flight. 
Both case studies show that organised anarchy dominated the poli-
cy-making structure, although both processes developed in different po-
litical contexts and in different periods of Kosovo’s state-building process. 
The privatisation process was initiated at a time when Kosovo was not an 
independent state but under full international administration, while the 
civil code process was initiated following Kosovo’s declaration of inde-
pendence. Despite the different political contexts, local actors were very 
passive, while the solution-driven processes remained dominated by var-
ious international actors. Kosovo, assuming the attributes of a sovereign 
state did not affect the organised anarchy, and it did not lead to a locally 
led problem-based policy process.
5. Conclusion
One has to be careful not to draw generalisations from two case studies, 
but they at least indicate that internationally driven institution-building in 
Kosovo, and especially the development of the rule of law, fits the descrip-
tion of organised anarchy. Internationally driven development of the rule 
of law implies the involvement of many different international and local 
actors. Given the different meanings of the rule of law, it is not surprising 
that each actor interprets this idea from a different perspective. In order 
to reduce complexity, it is also understandable if the different internation-
al actors, who spend only a limited period of time in the country which 
is going through a process of state-building, promote their national legal 
models as ready-made solutions for local problems. For Kosovo, adopt-
ing the best international and European standards almost always meant 
adopting a decontextualised solution promoted by an international actor. 
It did not really matter if that solution indeed solved the problem. In most 
cases, the problem remained, and perhaps new problems were created 
because of the inadequacy of the imported ready-made solution. Con-
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sequently this only triggered international actors to design new projects, 
provide additional funding and come up with new ready-made solutions, 
which again did not address the real issues. Competition between inter-
national actors only exacerbated the drive to sell ready-made solutions to 
Kosovars, who in most cases turned into mere spectators of power games 
between international actors. The Kosovars themselves did not show 
much enthusiasm to lead and own the policy processes, partially because 
of a sense of helplessness in view of the enormous international presence 
and its capacity to sell solutions to Kosovars, and partially because of the 
opportunity to free ride and extract individual and personal benefits from 
various international actors who sought to prevail in the competition for 
selling their solutions. Instead of Kosovars building their own state and 
rule of law system, which fits their context and needs, international actors 
built what they believed should be the state of Kosovo based on their 
preferences, modelled after their legal models, and in most cases without 
substantial input by the Kosovars.
Institutions certainly matter for economic development, but these insti-
tutions must be contextualised. This is a problem in internationally led 
institution-building when the international community consists of differ-
ent actors with different preferences and who promote their solutions in a 
decontextualised manner. In terms of international assistance, less seems 
sometimes to be more. In the absence of so much international financial 
and technical assistance, Kosovars would have been required to assume 
more ownership and leadership for solving their problems. Less interna-
tional assistance would also have meant less competition between inter-
national actors, and less pressure to adopt ready-made decontextualised 
solutions, which do not necessarily solve problems but may actually have 
triggered new problems. It is therefore not a surprise that after almost two 
decades of international administration and assistance, Kosovo’s rule of 
law system is still defunct and economic growth is not taking off. Any in-
ternationally led process of institution-building should take into consider-
ation that solution-driven policy processes, which are not contextualised, 
will do more harm than good.
25
























Aberbach, J. & Christensen, T. (2001). Radical reform in New Zealand: Crisis, 
windows of opportunity, and rational actors. Public Administration, 79(2), 
403-422. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00262
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail. London., United Kingdom: 
Profile Books Ltd.
Capussela, A. (2015). State-Building in Kosovo.  London, UK & New York, USA: 
I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
Cohen, M., March, J. & Olsen, J. (1972). A garbage can model of organiza-
tional choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1-25. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2392088
Coronna, M. (1985). The concept of social property and the rights of the for-
eign investor in Yugoslavia. Review of Socialist Law, 11, 227-247. https://doi.
org/10.1163/187529885x00232
Daniels, R. & Trebilcock, M. (2004). The political economy of rule of law reform 
in developing countries. Michigan Journal of International Law, 26(99), 99-140.
Everly, R. (2007). Reviewing governmental acts of the United Nations in Kosovo. 
German Law Journal, 8(1), 21-37. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200005393
Fioretti, G. & Lomi, A. (2009). Passing the buck in the garbage can model of or-
ganization choice. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 16, 
113-143. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-010-9070-6
Groenenwegen, J., Spithoven, A. & van den Berg, A. (2010). Institutional econom-
ics. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
Howlett, M., McConnell, A. & Perl, A. (2015). Streams and stages: Reconciling 
Kingdom and the policy process theory. European Journal of Political Research, 
54, 419-434. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12064
Kingdon, J. (2014). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. New York, USA: Pear-
son Education Limited.
Knoll, B. (2005). From benchmarking to final status? Kosovo and the problem of 
an international administration’s open-ended mandate. European Journal of 
International Law, 16(4), 637-660. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chi140
Knudsen, R. (2013). Privatization in Kosovo: „Liberal peace” in practice. Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7(3), 287-307. https://doi.org/10.1080/1750
2977.2012.734559
Krever, T. (2011). The legal turn in late development theory: The rule of law and 
the World Bank’s development model. Harvard International Law Journal, 
52(1), 287-319.
Lipson, M. (2007). A „garbage can model” of UN peacekeeping. Global Govern-
ance, 13(1), 79-97. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01301006
March, J. & Olson, J. (1983). Organizing political life: what administrative reor-
ganization tells us about government. American Political Science Review, 77(2), 
281-296. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958916
26





Medjad, K. (2004). The fate of the Yugoslav model: A case against legal con-
formity. American Journal of Comparative Law, 52(1), 287-319. https://doi.
org/10.2307/4144450




Peselj, B. (1963). Socialist law and the New Yugoslav Constitution. Georgetown 
Law Journal, 51(4), 651-705
Peters, G. (2002). Governance: A garbage can perspective. Vienna, Austria: Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies Vienna. Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/347/1/
wp_84.pdf 
Roccia, M. (2015). Reforming property law in Kosovo: A clash of legal orders. Eu-
ropean Review, 23(4), 566-582. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1062798715000307
Saurugger, S. & Terpan, F. (2016). Do crises lead to policy change? The multiple 
streams framework and the European Union’s economic governance instru-
ments. Policy Sciences, 49s(1), 35-53,.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-015-
9239-4
Saxonberg, S. & Sirovatka, T. (2014). From a garbage can to a compost model of 
decision-making? Social policy reform and the Czech government’s reaction 
to the international financial crisis. Social Policy & Administration, 48(4), 450-
467. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12070
Susino C. & Moreno, A. (2016). Evaluation of the project: Support to civil code 
and property rights in Kosovo [Unpublished report].
The World Bank (2017). World development report: Governance and the law [Re-
port]. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017 
United Nations (1999). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations In-
terim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/1999/987) [Report]. Retrieved from 
https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/report-secretary-general-united-nations-in-
terim-administration-mission-kosovo-s1999987
UNMIK (2002). The Ottoman dilemma: Power and property relations under the Unit-
ed Nations mission in Kosovo [Report]. Retrieved from https://www.esiweb.org/
pdf/esi_document_id_35.pdf 
Zaum, D. (2007). The sovereignty paradox. New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press.
27























ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF KOSOVO
Summary
The international community, led by the United Nations, created Kosovo’s new 
post-war institutions and continues to influence them, even after Kosovo declared 
independence in 2008. One of the very first priorities of the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was to establish the rule 
of law and to develop institutions and legal frameworks for a normally function-
ing economy. However, after almost two decades of internationally led institu-
tion-building, Kosovo is still, measured by European standards, a poor country 
with weak institutions. This paper shows that the creation of institutions does not 
follow a rational decision-making model, even when, like in Kosovo, institutions 
are created under direct international involvement and with the intention to 
develop the rule of law and facilitate economic development. The garbage can 
model approach to governance and decision-making provides a better expla-
nation of the formation of governance institutions and why institutions, despite 
perhaps the best intentions, do not produce the desired results; failing to solve 
the underlying policy problems. The case studies on the privatisation of socially 
owned property and the development of contract law show that, in the case of 
Kosovo, adopting the best international and European standards almost always 
meant adopting a decontextualised solution promoted by an international ac-
tor. It did not really matter if that solution indeed solved the problem. In fact, 
in most cases the problem remained, with new problems being created because 
of the inadequacy of the imported ready-made solution. The conclusion is that 
sometimes less international assistance is more. In the absence of so much in-
ternational financial and technical assistance, Kosovar leadership would have 
been required to assume more ownership of the policy-making for solving their 
problems. Less international assistance would also have meant less competition 
between international actors and less pressure to adopt ready-made decontextu-
alised solutions.
Keywords: organised anarchy, garbage can model, Kosovo, institution-build-
ing, rule of law, international administration
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IZGRADNJA INSTITUCIJA POD MEĐUNARODNOM UPRAVOM: 
SLUČAJ KOSOVA
Sažetak
Međunarodna zajednica, predvođena Ujedinjenim narodima, koja je izgradila 
kosovske nove poslijeratne institucije, i dalje ima znatan utjecaj na njih nakon 
proglašenja samostalnosti Kosova 2008. Među prioritetima Privremene misije 
Ujedinjenih naroda na Kosovu (United Nations Interim Administration Mi-
ssion in Kosovo – UNMIK) bila je uspostava vladavine prava te izgradnja in-
stitucija i zakonskog okvira za normalno funkcioniranje gospodarstva. Nakon 
gotovo dva desetljeća tijekom kojih su se institucije gradile pod direktivom među-
narodne zajednice, Kosovo je i dalje prema europskim standardima siromašna 
zemlja sa slabim institucijama. Uzimajući kao primjer slučaj Kosova, želi se 
pokazati da izgradnja institucija ne slijedi model racionalnih odluka, pa čak 
i kada se institucije kreiraju uz međunarodnu pomoć zato da se uspostavi vla-
davina prava i omogući gospodarski razvitak. Model donošenja odluka „kante 
za smeće“ bolje opisuje način na koji se grade vladine institucije i zašto, unatoč 
najboljim namjerama, takve institucije ne daju željene rezultate i ne uspijevaju 
riješiti postojeće političke probleme. Proučavajući privatizaciju društvenih po-
duzeća i nastajanje ugovornog prava na primjeru Kosova, pokazalo se da pri-
hvaćanje najboljih međunarodnih i europskih standarda znači prihvaćanje de-
kontekstualiziranih rješenja koja promoviraju međunarodni akteri, unatoč tomu 
što ta rješenja nisu riješila probleme. Dapače, u većini slučajeva problemi su 
ostali prisutni, a novi su se stvorili jer su nametnuta neprikladna gotova rješenja. 
Analiza dovodi do zaključka da je moguće postići više uz manje međunarodne 
potpore jer bi u nedostatku međunarodne financijske i tehničke potpore kosovsko 
vodstvo bilo prisiljeno preuzeti odgovornost pri donošenju odluka za rješavanje 
svojih problema. Manje međunarodne pomoći značilo bi manje konkurencije 
među međunarodnim akterima i manji pritisak da se prihvate gotova dekontek-
stualizirana rješenja.
Ključne riječi: organizirana anarhija, model „kante za smeće“, Kosovo, izgrad-
nja institucija, vladavina prava, međunarodna uprava
